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Abstract 
China’s diplomacy is among the many accomplishments of China during the 
period of reform and opening up. The People’s Republic of China is emerging fully 
on to the world’s stage, and in a largely positive fashion. It now has both interests 
and a presence in parts of the world completely new to China—such as Latin 
America and the Middle East. Beijing has managed its relations well with the major 
world powers—United States, Russia, and the European Union. It has transformed 
its regional diplomacy in Asia, reasserted a role in Africa, and has become more 
active in multilateral organizations. Thirty years ago, at the outset of the “reform 
and opening” era, China acted hesitantly on the world stage, limiting itself largely to 
its united front tactics against Soviet “social imperialism.” Its diplomats were not 
very sophisticated and rarely left their embassies abroad. In the United Nations, 
China’s preferred medium of voting was to abstain (especially on sensitive issues). 
In short, China’s diplomacy was hesitant and not confident, inward-looking not 
outward looking, parochial and not sophisticated, reactive not proactive, and 
composed more of words than deeds. Today, these latter characterizations better 
describe China’s diplomacy. 
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Introduction 
China’s diplomacy is among the many accomplishments of China during the 
period of reform and opening up. The People’s Republic of China is emerging fully 
on to the world’s stage, and in a largely positive fashion. It now has both interests 
and a presence in parts of the world completely new to China—such as Latin 
America and the Middle East. Beijing has managed its relations well with the major 
world powers—United States, Russia, and the European Union. It has transformed 
its regional diplomacy in Asia, reasserted a role in Africa, and has become more 
active in multilateral organizations. 
Thirty years ago, at the outset of the “reform and opening” era, China acted 
hesitantly on the world stage, limiting itself largely to its united front tactics against 
Soviet “social imperialism.” Its diplomats were not very sophisticated and rarely left 
their embassies abroad. In international conferences and organizations, China’s 
representatives rarely said a word—and when they did speak it was pure 
propagandistic rhetoric carefully prepared in Beijing. No press conferences were 
offered to foreign media, at home or abroad. In the United Nations, China’s 
preferred medium of voting was to abstain (especially on sensitive issues). In short, 
China’s diplomacy was hesitant and not confident, inward-looking not outward 
looking, parochial and not sophisticated, reactive not proactive, and composed 
more of words than deeds. Today, these latter characterizations better describe 
China’s diplomacy. 
Many more examples illustrate the profound reorientation and global 
engagement of China. Consider the following examples. 
 
China and the United States 
China’s relations with the world’s only superpower—the United States—
used to be troubled by various problems, not the least of which was Taiwan. While 
there remain various irritants and difficulties in this complex relationship, on 
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balance it has achieved a high level of cooperation, stability, and normalcy. The 
Taiwan issue has been managed well so as to ensure stability across the strait, 
even if Washington’s policies have not met Beijing’s satisfaction (i.e. arms sales). 
The relationship has become deeply interdependent at the societal level and 
deeply institutionalized on the governmental level.  
Over the past three decades the relationship has transformed dramatically 
and has arguably become the world’s most important one among major powers. 
Today relations are the best they have been since the disruptive events of 1989.  
Sino-American cooperation is imperative to global and regional order, and the two 
sides are interacting on a wide range of global issues.  This reality is a reflection of 
how far the relationship has come since 1979.  Thirty years ago it was a shadow of 
its current cast. Consider the following dimensions of changes. 
The financial relationship has become the most important one in the world. 
Trade has grown from $2.5 billion in 1979 to over $400 billion in 2008. The U.S. is 
China’s single largest national trading partner (the EU is collectively larger).  Nearly 
all the Fortune 500 U.S. companies do business in China, investing in more than 
50,000 Chinese enterprises with a paid-in total of more than $50 billion. Walmart 
alone, if a country instead of a company, would rank as China’s seventh largest 
trading partner.  Meanwhile, China has become America’s largest creditor, 
amassing $585 billion in U.S. Treasury bonds by September—a figure that may 
have swelled to over $700 billion by year’s end (China also purchases U.S debt 
instruments through third countries, which analysts say could bring the total closer 
to $1 trillion). 
Interdependence binds Chinese and American societies together. Several 
million of Chinese passport holders live on “green cards” and work in the U.S., and 
many commute regularly between the two countries for business. Thirty years ago 
there were no Chinese students studying in American universities; this academic 
year there are 67,000, while there are 11,000 Americans studying on China’s 
campuses. 
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The inter-governmental relationship has never been broader or more deeply 
institutionalized. Thirty years ago the first agreements were signed drawing the two 
bureaucracies into contact—today there are more than 60 bilateral dialogues and 
working groups in existence. The most important of these are the Strategic and 
Economic Dialogue (SAED). The communication in these dialogues is professional, 
respectful, and cooperative. At a higher level, the two presidents communicate 
frequently by secure telephone and meet several times per year at international 
meetings. 
Although the two countries shared a common enemy with the former Soviet 
Union back in 1979, and worked effectively together to counter Soviet 
expansionism, in reality the relationship was limited to Asia as China had little or no 
presence in other regions of the world. Not so today, as Beijing is a global player 
on all continents.  Beijing’s global presence is largely commercial, diplomatic, 
political (with local parties), and increasingly in an array of “soft power” cultural 
instruments.  As a result, China and the U.S. are bumping up against each other in 
new regions of the world—Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, Middle East. This is 
only going to continue, and it behooves both sides to better understand the other’s 
vital interests in these third areas. 
The Taiwan issue, which has plagued the relationship over the years and 
has brought the two nations to the brink of war several times since 1950, has 
shown significant signs of amelioration since May 2008. Even before Ma Ying-
cheou’s election as Taiwan’s president, which started the trend, Washington and 
Beijing worked effectively to contain his predecessor (Chen Shui-bian) from 
provoking a major crisis through his pursuit of independence for the island.  
The two sides have certainly had their share of crises and 
misunderstandings over the past 30 years (and continue to have differences in 
several policy areas), but each one was defused without deteriorating into conflict. 
Both sides are nuclear powers and are keenly aware that a conventional military 
conflict would not be easily contained. Just as the U.S. and China can contribute 
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much to peace and stability in Asia and the world, so too do they share the 
capacity to destabilize and destroy the world should an adversarial relationship 
occur. This is one reason why bilateral military exchanges (currently suspended) 
are so important to strategic stability. 
After three, sometimes rocky, decades of interaction, the United States and 
China seem to have settled into a “mature marriage,” where mutual respect, mutual 
interests, and an awareness of the negative consequences of an adversarial 
relationship bind the two together. In this marriage divorce is not an option. Having 
achieved this level of interdependence, hopefully the next thirty years will bear real 
fruit of bilateral, regional, and global cooperation. 
  
China and Europe 
China’s relations with Europe have also never been as well developed. The 
European Union (EU) is now China’s largest trading partner, while China ranks 
number 2 for Europe. Numerous other indicators illustrate the new depth and 
breadth of the Sino-European relationship—not the least of which is the 1.2 million 
Chinese tourists now visiting Europe annually and the 190,000 Chinese students 
now studying in European universities.  
Since 2006, however, there have appeared “storm clouds” on the horizon for 
Sino-European relations and the relationship has deteriorated over several mutual 
concerns. These include the issues of Tibet and China’s concerns about the 
meetings between the Dalai Lama and several European leaders; issues related to 
China’s huge trade surplus with the EU, dumping products on the European market, 
and lack of enforcement of intellectual property rights in China; issues related to 
the 2008 Olympic Games in China and the European protests during the Olympic 
torch relay prior to the Games; issues related to European concerns about the 
human rights situation in China; issues related to the 2008-2009 global financial 
crisis; Europe’s continuing refusal to grant Market Economy Status for China and 
6 Asia Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers 2010 - 31  
to lift the EU arms embargo against China; a hardening of European public 
perceptions of China; and a toughening of the European Commission’s policy 
statements concerning China.  
For all of these, and other, reasons, 2007-2008 witnessed a deterioration of 
Sino-European relations, culminating in China’s cancellation of the annual China-
EU Summit to be held in Lyon, France in December 2008. This downturn stands in 
stark contrast to the previous decade of robust development of relations. Both 
sides have expressed interest in arresting the decline, and mutual efforts brought 
some stabilization in 2009. Unlike the U.S.-China relationship, which has 
developed and deepened over three decades, the Sino-European relationship has 
a much shorter history (dating really to the end of the Cold War) and hence a more 
shallow foundation. 
 
China and Asia 
Closer to home, after years of strained relations, China has recently made 
amends with both Taiwan and Japan. The importance of these rapprochements 
cannot be understated. East Asia cannot be stable if the Taiwan Strait and 
particularly Sino-Japanese relations are not stable—and East Asia has not been 
stable in recent years for these reasons. But with the new momentum in both 
cross-strait and China-Japan ties, the essential nature of East Asian international 
relations is changing….for the better. 
More broadly, China’s regional diplomacy in Asia has been remarkable.  
China’s own diplomacy has grown more confident, omni-directional, and proactive; 
its economy is now a major engine of regional growth; its military is steadily 
modernizing; and its regional security posture is increasingly seen as benign.  
China has also coupled these developments with an assertive reassurance 
campaigns which are aimed at regional (and other foreign) audiences and intended 
to rebut the twin theories of “China Threat” and “China Collapse.” As a result of 
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China’s regional rise, countries all around China’s periphery are adjusting and 
adapting their relations with Beijing, as well as with each other.  Consequently, a 
new regional order is taking shape. 
In Asia, China used to be seen as a territorially expansionist nation, having 
fought border wars with India, Russia, Vietnam, and the United States in Korea—
as well as skirmishes with Taiwan and the Philippines. In addition, China claimed 
much of the South China Sea and East China Sea. Today, China has settled all of 
its land border disputes, expect with India, and has signed agreements with 
Southeast Asian nations on the South China Sea and Japan on the East China 
Sea. 
Just a few years ago, China was seen by many of its neighbors as an 
aspiring regional hegemon. But these fears have dissipated considerably, although 
not disappeared. Instead, China has signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
with many Asian states, has been instrumental in forming the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, has established itself as the key to regional economic 
growth and interdependence, and—most importantly—has improved its bilateral 
ties with all of its neighbors, including those who had previously been adversaries. 
Finally, one must take note of China extraordinary economic role in Asia. 
Approximately half of China’s total foreign trade is now intraregional. China has 
become the engine of Asian regional growth—although the Japanese economy still 
far outstrips China’s in aggregate size. The regional production chain in Asia is 
now centered in China.  
 
China and Latin America 
While China enjoys strong diplomatic ties throughout most of Latin America 
(except the 12 nations that still recognize Taiwan), commerce is by far the most 
important dimension of China’s presence in Latin America.  
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Total trade for 2008 (according to Chinese customs statistics) reached USD 
$141.9 billion, and it is in balance (China imported $71.3 billion and exported $70.6 
billion). This is a dramatic increase of more than 11 times since 2000, and the 
growth rate seems to be accelerating—it surged more than 40 percent from 2007 
to 2008! China is now the No. 1 trading partner of many Latin nations. Brazil 
dominates regional trade with China, accounting for almost 40 percent of the total.  
While two-way trade has grown dramatically in recent years—from $50 billion in 
2005 to more than $140 billion in 2008—it still only accounts for about 5 percent of 
China’s total foreign trade. While Brazil is China’s largest export market in Latin 
America, it only ranks as China’s No. 20 trading partner. 
In terms of trade composition, though, it is heavily concentrated and non-
diversified. It is dominated by Chinese purchases of raw materials and agricultural 
commodities; fully 70 percent of Brazil’s exports to China are in two commodities 
(iron ore and soybeans).   China imports large amounts and a wide range of 
minerals, energy supplies, and raw materials from Latin America. In 2008, this 
included $16.8 billion in iron ore; $7.4 billion in copper ores; $5.8 billion in refined 
copper; $9.4 billion in crude and refined oil; and lesser (but still significant) 
amounts of aluminum, nickel, lead ores, zinc, manganese, and molybdenum. 
China’s purchases of oil (refined and unrefined) from the region are also growing: 
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez promised in Beijing in April to quintuple his 
country’s daily deliveries from 200,000 to 1 million barrels per day! Brazil’s will 
grow to 200,000 per day (from the current 150,000) beginning in 2010.  
China’s voracious appetite for these raw materials have contributed to the 
high global price levels for these commodities (and has provided a significant 
revenue stream for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru). Today China consumes 
about 40 percent of the world’s coal, 25 percent of the nickel, 25 percent of iron 
ores, 20 percent of copper ores, and 14 percent of aluminum. China is the No. 1 
and 2 leading importers of iron ore and copper in the world. 
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In return, Latin countries purchase a range of electronics (largely cell 
phones and computers) and manufactures. Large Chinese exports of textiles, 
footwear and other low-end consumer goods has hit several Latin economies 
hard—particularly Mexico and Argentina. Gradually, China is beginning to move up 
the technological ladder in its regional trade—beginning to trade in autos, 
motorcycles, aircraft and aircraft parts, electronics, and agro-, bio-, nano-, and 
information technologies. On the whole, with the exception of Mexico (and a lesser 
extent Argentina) Latin America’s and China’s economies are complimentary rather 
than directly competitive. 
China’s rapidly growing commercial presence in Latin America is illustrative 
of its growing global economic footprint and clout. 
 
China and Africa 
China’s position in Africa is longer, deeper, and more multifaceted than with 
Latin America. China’s ties to Africa date to the 1950s-1970s, atrophied somewhat 
during the 1980s, but have expanded considerably since the 1990s.  
Two-way trade reached $106.8 billion in 2008 and exhibited some of the 
same characteristics as in Latin America: large-scale imports of raw materials and 
oil from Africa in exchange for a wide range of low-end manufactured goods from 
China. Angola, South Africa, Sudan, Nigeria, and Egypt are China’s top five trade 
partners on the continent. As in Latin America, China is deeply involved in the 
energy and raw material sectors—investing, purchasing, and extracting. This has 
caused some concern in some African countries, which complain of China’s neo-
colonialist practices. 
China is also deeply engaged in providing aid and assistance to African 
countries. This comes in a number of forms. One form is low or no-interest loans. 
By 2008, China’s Export-Import Bank was believed to be funding more than 300 
projects in 36 African countries.  Direct aid is another form. By 2008, China had 
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signed bilateral aid accords with 48 or Africa’s 53 countries. Direct infrastructure 
construction is another form. Reliable data are not available for this category, as 
the usual practice is not to transfer the funds to recipient countries, but rather to 
fund Chinese companies that dispatch laborers and materials abroad to construct 
hard infrastructure (roads, bridges, buildings, stadiums, ports, etc.). Yet another 
form is direct investment by Chinese multinational companies. Again, data are not 
available—but companies such as Huawei have been quite involved in upgrading 
telecom and electrical networks in some African countries. The final category of 
Chinese aid is in technical training programs. This category involves a range of 
activities—including establishing technical training centers; dispatching medical 
personnel to hospitals and clinics; sending youth volunteers to rural areas; and 
providing approximately 4000 scholarships per year for African students to study in 
China. 
Diplomatically, as in Latin America, Beijing continues to wage a battle with 
Taipei for diplomatic recognition from a small number of African states. But, on the 
whole, China enjoys broad and sound diplomatic ties across the continent. In some 
cases—notably Sudan and Zimbabwe—this has drawn sharp criticism from 
Western countries and human rights organizations.  As in Latin America, the 
Chinese Communist Party’s International Department is also extremely active in 
cultivating local politicians in both ruling and opposition parties. China also supplies 
several African militaries with weapons.  Finally, Beijing has established the 
multilateral Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).   
 
Global Governance 
China has become much more deeply engaged with international 
organizations and across a range of “global governance” issues. While Beijing 
remains a “selective multilateralist”—engaging on some issues and not others—the 
broad trend has been positive and in the direction of deeper contributions to the 
global community. 
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China used to eschew multilateralism, distrusting it as some kind of 
(Western) conspiracy. Until the late-1990s, China stayed outside of regional 
multilateral groupings in East Asia, but today is deeply embedded and involved in 
the multitiered architecture of Asian interstate and nongovernmental institutions. 
Moreover, Beijing is seen as a participatory, constructive, and cooperative force in 
these groupings. 
China used to oppose (or be agnostic at best) about the five bilateral 
alliances that the United States maintains in East Asia with Australia, Japan, South 
Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and the Philippines. During the 1997-98 period, 
Chinese officials became particularly critical—calling for the abrogation of all 
alliances (worldwide) as unnecessary vestiges of the Cold War. Today, China says 
that it welcomes the United States’ presence in Asia, gives credit to the U.S. for 
helping to provide the “public good” of security and stability in the region that has 
afforded the dramatic economic growth and social development across the region 
over the past three decades. 
Previously, when there were regional security or political problems (or “hot 
spots” as Chinese analysts like to describe them) or regional natural disasters 
(such as the 2006 tsunami in South and Southeast Asia), Beijing stood quiet and 
aloof. Today, China is engaged and involved. The most noteworthy example at 
present is China’s critical intermediary role in the Six Party Talks concerning North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons program, although Beijing played a crucial role in settling 
the Cambodian conflict in the 1980s. China has also contributed United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) forces to East Timor. When natural disasters 
strike, China is now there to provide physical and financial assistance. 
China’s contributions to peacekeeping in East Timor are not unique. China 
now has nearly 2000 personnel deployed in nearly 20 nations worldwide—more 
than any other member of the United Nations Security Council. Half of these are 
deployed in Lebanon, but Chinese military and paramilitary personnel are also 
deployed in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. 
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This is one tangible expression of China’s strong commitment to the United 
Nations. The PRC may be the greatest advocate of the UN among major powers in 
the world today. It is much more proactive in the UN Security Council, especially 
forging consensus on crucial sensitive issues. In its voting patterns, China is no 
longer viewed as a “free rider”—although its financial contributions to UN operating 
budgets remain far below similar powers and Security Council members. 
In the field of arms control, China used to be a serious proliferator of 
missiles and missile components, and a significant seller of conventional arms. 
Beijing even assisted Pakistan and North Korea with their nuclear weapons 
programs. Today, China is a firm and loyal adherent of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Biological and Conventional Weapons 
Conventions, Nuclear Suppliers Group, and has essentially adhered to the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (although it is not a member). 
In the military realm, China has taken a number of important steps forward. 
First, until about 2004 China refused to participate in multilateral or bilateral military 
exercises with foreign nations—increasingly it is involved in naval search and 
rescue and land counter-terrorism exercises. This is a beginning, although the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has a long way to go to reach global standards of 
multilateral cooperation. Concerning military transparency, the situation is similar: 
progress has been made in recent years, through the publication of defense White 
Papers, but the amount of information disclosed falls far short of not only global—
but particularly regional standards in Asia. The PLA has stepped up its military 
exchanges with foreign nations worldwide, including training of foreign officers at 
the National Defense University in Beijing. 
 
In Sum 
All in all, Chinese diplomacy has made great strides over the past 30 years, 
since Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening” at the Third Plenary Session of the 
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11th Party Congress in December 1978. This is not the China that the world used to 
know: a “revisionist” destabilizing power that sought to overturn the international 
order. Today, the People’s Republic of China is deeply involved across the globe 
and is increasingly a firm upholder of, and contributor to, the existing international 
order. This alone is a profound statement for observers of China’s international 
posture since 1949. 
 
Nonetheless, there remain a number of questions about China’s long-term 
intentions and global posture. As it expands its presence, how will it use its 
increasing power and influence? Will it seek to establish spheres of influence, as 
previous major powers have done? Will it seek to undermine or substantially alter 
the post-World War II international system? Will it act as a neo-colonial power in 
developing countries, extracting resources and providing aid without insisting on 
global standards of domestic governance? Will it seek to establish a global military 
presence? These and other questions remain to be answered by future Chinese 
behavior on the global stage.  
 
* The author is Director of the China Policy Program and Professor of Political 
Science & International Affairs at George Washington University, and a 
nonresident Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings 
Institution, both in Washington, D.C.  He is also an Honorary Research Professor 
at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS), and during 2009-2010 he is 
a Visiting Fulbright Research Scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
(CASS) Institute of World Economics and Politics in Beijing. 
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